


# Strategy Research Project International Fellow

## The Battle for Minds. Defeating Toxic Ideologies in the 21st Century

by

Colonel R. J. Boyd  
British Army



United States Army War College  
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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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Colonel R. J. Boyd  
British Army

Dr. William T. Allison  
Department of National Security and Strategy  
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013



## **Abstract**

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The West is losing the battle of minds against al Qaeda, a toxic ideology. While DIME remains a useful methodology for strategy formulation and resourcing, it is too Jominian to meet the challenge of winning the ‘battle for minds’ over those that toxic ideologies currently appeal to, and will so in the future. To defeat such ideologies a longer term, multi-generational, strategic model that establishes Security, Re-educes and then Educates future generations is needed. Analysis of al Qaeda, future ideological threats, the US rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific, European experience, British political will, a historical analysis of the re-education of post WWII Germany and Japan, and British societal and educational infrastructure, reveals that the United Kingdom is in prime position to develop an internationally sponsored institution to coordinate a new strategy to defeat the current, and future, toxic ideologies that challenge ‘Minimalist’ global values and norms.



## **The Battle for Minds. Defeating Toxic Ideologies in the 21st Century**

We are in the midst of a generational struggle against an ideology which is an extreme distortion of the Islamic faith, and which holds that mass murder and terror are not only acceptable but necessary. We must tackle this poisonous thinking at home and abroad and resist the ideologues' attempt to divide the world into a clash of civilizations.

—British Prime Minister David Cameron, January 21 2013.

We are losing a battle. It is not the military battles, nor the diplomatic battle, neither is it the economic battle nor, in totality, the informational battle. The outcome of today's war rests in a battle currently hedged in favor of the enemy; a battle to win over the minds of a generation of jihadists, and the generations that may follow them. The initiative in this battle has always rested with al Qaeda and its associates, and has never been fully challenged by the moderate West and likeminded emerging global community. To rehash an old Clausewitzian analogy, it needs to be wrestled back, and put down before the 21<sup>st</sup> century's new world order is split once more by David Cameron's new clash of civilizations.<sup>1</sup> Defeating toxic ideologies requires a multi-generational, multi-national, multi-faceted approach, and an intellectual leap of faith to revisit and re-tailor the traditional strategic levers of power that have been long hailed - somewhat Jominianly - as the principles that guide the application of strategy. The DIME paradigm is not enough to defeat this enemy.<sup>2</sup> For a successful outcome to this war, to finally embattle it in its entirety, education may need to be raised as an equal partner to the existing strategic levers of power.

This paper challenges the current DIME orthodoxy in order to defeat toxic ideologies. It suggests that whilst DIME remains important, education can be, and has been, raised as a strategic lever in its own right to defeat anti (or toxic) ideologies. In

these cases DIME has taken an enabling role and should do so again. Stressing that this is can only work over the long-term, it offers a model for success based on establishing Security—Re-education—Education over several generations. Examining al Qaeda's strategy, it confirms that changes of strategic priorities for the United States and Europe may provide an opportunity for a more holistic methodology to finally defeat al Qaeda across every strategic battle-space. It concludes that the United Kingdom is in a prime position due to history, governance, education, and because of its current and future political leadership to take on the development of the strategy to defeat toxic ideologies, such as al Qaeda, and should seize the opportunity now to do so.

This paper is not designed to provide a definitive answer to the of defeat toxic ideologies, but hopes to prompt further analysis on how education could be embraced to win one of the strategic battles in the war against 'Maximalism.' It offers the suggestion that a global institution (based in the United Kingdom) to coordinate, educate and assist nations in developing moderate attitudes and open-mindedness, may be a useful start point for operationalizing a 'new' strategic lever; education.

### A Multi-Generational Model

There has been gathering momentum within the rhetoric of British Prime Ministers that the West now finds itself in a generational struggle. In addition to Prime Minister David Cameron's recent comments, former Prime Minister Tony Blair recently offered the following magnification.

It is even more clear to me that the battle against militant Islam has to be fought with every means at our disposal, and fought until it is won...When you look at this since 9/11, we in the West want to go in and think there will be a clean result. It's not going to happen like that. We now know that it is going to be long, difficult and messy. You have to take a long-term view and be prepared to engage over that long-term...we are talking about a generation.

The virulent form of Islam in Mali, [with] connections throughout Africa, is trying to destabilize sub-Saharan Africa through terrorist attacks rising out of the same ideology. Because this is driven by a strong ideology with the desire to push out of borders, if we disengage we will see a different set of problems further down the line that are more serious.

If you drive these people into the hills, they will come back. So how do you stay there for the long term? I have studied this a lot since I left office...I have learnt two things: Firstly, you have to build capacity in states that may fail to govern themselves sensibly. Secondly, you have to deal with religious extremism...by trying to create a set of circumstances, for example in how children are educated in their countries, to lead them to an open-minded, not closed-minded, view of the world.

—Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, BBC Interview, February 2, 2013.<sup>3</sup>

British leadership's recent acknowledgement of the need to re-engage this ideology may be in part due to a realization that Europe is about to find itself on the frontline of the fight against an al Qaeda inspired ideology that is spreading from the source of European energy supplies in the Middle East to the sub-Sahara, Somalia, Sudan and the Yemen. Europe's awakening is occurring at a time when the so called 'Arab Awakening' has further destabilized the region in Europe's Mediterranean Muslim border-states (and additional oil producers) in Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, and Syria. Simultaneously, the United States is pivoting towards the Asia-Pacific to face a resurgent China, nuclear North Korea and a plethora of flash points that threaten global trading norms. The United States is also rapidly moving towards - Americas-based - energy self-sufficiency, further reducing American reliance on the region. As the United States switches its main effort, Europe suddenly finds itself in the lead without the full potential of the world's super power to flex its, traditionally well-resourced, DIME muscle on her behalf. Europe is broke, so needs to seek imaginative alternatives, while, as Blair puts it, using every means at its own disposal, no matter how limited these may currently be. Taking a multi-generational approach against toxic ideologies will not only

now require Europe's DIME levers to be increasingly strategized into action, but as Tony Blair also points out, we need to educate al Qaeda's target audience for open-mindedness and moderation over time.

To achieve this, it is important first to analyze where the priorities for DIME sit across a multi-generational fight and then establish where education can have an impact. Figure 1 outlines where each strategic lever has a major effect over the course of a long campaign. Of course, no two campaigns are identical and timelines may vary, but in the battle to defeat anti-ideologies,<sup>4</sup> historical evidence demonstrates that it can take up to three generations before the toxic ideas can be truly lanced from societies.




Figure 1. The relationship between the strategic levers of power and education over campaign duration.

When engaging ideologies, there are three stages that loosely complement the model's short, medium and long-term phases. The first stage is establishing security. This may be the result or reason for invasion or war, as a result of revolution, or collapse of governance in a region. Without security, usually (but not exclusively)

military driven, the remaining strategic levers remain largely impotent. Establishing security may involve a short-term military contribution. In the case of World War II, it took six years to subdue Germany and Japan to establish security, and took nearly two generations until militarism and Nazism were finally removed from their societies. World War II did not end in 1945. It took a further generation to conclude the final battle for the minds of their people. In the case of the Afghanistan, because of counter-insurgency operations, it has taken over ten years to reach a level of security that allows the remaining levers - and education - to begin to have an effect.

The second stage is re-education, which lasts for a generation. Supported by DIME, it provides the local populous with sound governance while introducing more moderate ideologies before establishing a culturally attuned, global values-based education system for the succeeding generation. In a violent theater, re-education should concentrate on leadership and youth (particularly males below the age of 26 who are most prone to aggression). The third stage is education.

The education stage maintains democratization, good governance and economic development through the establishment of a liberal education system. It is here that, in cultures where gender issues exist, education can open doors for female opportunity, yet such ideas can take a generation for initial cultural acceptance. Female education provides vital balance to societies and underpins global values and freedoms, but in certain cultures introducing the idea during the re-education stage is often, pragmatically, all that can be hoped for. Patient strategic change for women's rights may be better than challenging the authority of men too early, who may revert rapidly

back to reestablishing their power, undoing the often hard fought for establishment of security in the first place.

Education can of course produce anti-ideologies that can spawn into more toxic ideals. But reaching self-actualization requires norms to be challenged regularly. As has been the case for many generations in Europe, moderate teaching backed by stable governance and a growing economy, has generally kept extremism to an absorbable minimum within societies.<sup>5</sup> In Europe, anti and toxic ideologies have often been defeated over generations after the root causes have been determined and addressed. The United States' strategy against al Qaeda appears to have been based on the more short-term Israeli counter-terrorist strategy; demonize, attack through DIME, refuse to address the root cause, and thus prevent negotiations that inevitably result in the more powerful side having to give ground. It has failed. Using this multi-generational model of Security—Re-education—Education, which has historical precedence in defeating toxic ideologies, may provide the strategy to take back the initiative from the 21<sup>st</sup> Century's first toxic ideology. It may also require a European lead.

#### Al Qaeda – The 21<sup>st</sup> Century's First, and Undefeated, Toxic Ideology

As many military geniuses from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz and beyond have pointed out, the start point before undertaking any strategic endeavor is to understand the situation and enemy you are about to face. Once more British leadership seems to have recently realized this. The next British Prime Minister (given recent United Kingdom polling results), Ed Miliband, also appears to understand the timelines, as well as multi-faceted and international requirements needed for success.

The task is to understand the nature of the new threat – more decentralized, more fragmented, taking advantage of the ungoverned spaces and security vacuum in parts of North Africa. The work to deal with

[al Qaeda] will be painstaking. Diplomatic and political, as well as military. Collaborative and multilateral, not unilateral. There is no quick fix.

—Leader of the United Kingdom Opposition Parties, Ed Miliband, January 21, 2013.<sup>6</sup>

### Why Al Qaeda and not the Taliban?

Firstly, while the Taliban grab headlines for the destruction of schools in Afghanistan and North West Pakistan and attempt assassinations on schoolgirls and teachers to deter progress, there are already international initiatives in place to bring about a long term defeat of the Taliban.<sup>7</sup> In Pakistan security efforts continue in order to defeat Taliban sabotage and the United Nations Education Envoy, another former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, has done much to highlight the issue and increase international pressure on the Pakistan government to continue its actions to protect its already well-established education system. In Afghanistan, a plethora of international, national provincial reconstruction teams and non-governmental organizations have contributed to the establishment of an Afghan run national education system that includes education for both boys and girls at primary level through to the re-establishment of Kabul University. There is still much to do, but it is a good - international - start that has gathered momentum.

Secondly, the Taliban are not an ideology, an idea perhaps, but not a fully fledged ideology. The Taliban's strategic objective is to maintain regional power by retaining control of ill-educated, largely rural, populations. This maintains young male dominance within a highly conservative society. By maintaining illiteracy the Taliban also control access to religion, passing on Qur'anic texts by word of mouth, despite the first revelation to the Prophet Mohammed from the Angel Gabriel being to, "Read! Your Lord is the Most Bountiful One, who taught by [means of] the pen."<sup>8</sup> As education takes

hold in the region, it is only a matter of time before the majority of Afghans read this for themselves and take a different path; almost akin to Europe's enlightenment thanks to Guttenberg's first non-Latin publication of the Bible.

There is therefore a stark difference between Taliban and al Qaeda strategies which means that, unless one is challenged, it can continue to flourish over time whilst the other withers. Where the Taliban are regional and regressive, al Qaeda is transnational and progressive, relying on education and a literal - if toxic - reading of the Qur'anic texts. If the current momentum on education can be sustained in North West Pakistan by the Pakistani government and in Afghanistan by an ever-maturing Afghanistan government, the Taliban will be defeated over two generations. Moreover, international engagement is guaranteed over the long-term on this issue. Gordon Brown continues to push the example of brave Malala Yousafzai, a Pakistani schoolgirl shot by the Taliban for challenging girls' rights to be educated, as a statement of international intent to continue with this worthy project.<sup>9</sup>

Even after 2014, when the bulk of Western combat troops will be withdrawn in favor of Afghan-led security, the Afghanistan campaign stands a chance of success. The International Security Assistance Force, under British command, have trained, re-educated and effectively politically patriotized the Afghan Army since the establishment of constitutional democracy in 2003. In conjunction with the international community's efforts to develop humanitarian assistance plans and educational initiatives to overcome illiteracy and increase educational opportunities for girls and women, Security—Re-education—Education is happening in Afghanistan.<sup>10</sup>

When President Obama made the following statement in his convention speech in September 2012, he got it wrong: "We've blunted the Taliban's momentum in Afghanistan, and in 2014 our longest war will be over. A new tower rises above the New York skyline, al Qaeda is on the path to defeat, and Osama bin Laden is dead."<sup>11</sup> Yet because of continuing domestic led efforts and ever increasing international impetus to re-educate and educate in Afghanistan and Pakistan, it is the Taliban who are on the (multi-generational) path to defeat and it is al Qaeda's momentum in Afghanistan that has been blunted. Now re-located in Africa, al Qaeda's momentum is actually increasing. Because the international community has yet to challenge it ideologically, al Qaeda is winning a battle, whilst Taliban ideas gradually wane.

#### Why does Al Qaeda Remain a Powerful Ideological Threat?

The answer to this question lies partly in al Qaeda's historical roots and organization. Thomas X. Hammes suggests that bin Laden produced a simple but resilient and highly effective organization in the 1990s, with bin Laden as unquestioned leader of a staff of talented and *well-educated* subordinates.<sup>12</sup> He formed a consultation council of Islamic elders who headed separate subordinate committees. As a capable administrator, bin Laden was then able to organize his worldwide network into three functional areas, Islamic study, military, and finance – each with a supervising committee.

The Islamic study committee provides the religious ideology and guidance to the movement and followers as well as Islamic schools that al Qaeda members attend as part of their training.<sup>13</sup> It debates Islamic law, issues fatwas and guides the organization's information campaign for al Qaeda actions. Because much of the Islamic world relies on an oral tradition to overcome teachings in the original Arabic, and

because the committee exploits the stamp of famous Islamic scholars to validate their cause, the organization successfully targets a huge population of disadvantaged and poorly educated Muslims in North Africa, Afghanistan/Pakistan, and to a certain extent Indonesia. The Islamic study committee also provides an extensive network of religious schools, which largely target young males. As Thomas X. Hammes contends, "In the same way as Mao created a unifying philosophy and intensive, repetitive study of the same, the Islamic Action Committee provides a specifically tailored version of the teaching of Mohammed, to strengthen the resolve of their soldiers. They also provide the schools that steep al Qaeda recruits in that philosophy."<sup>14</sup> When the Taliban, whose leadership were largely a product of strict Islamic schools, provided the opportunity for al Qaeda to establish and run training camps and religious schools, al Qaeda seized the opportunity to rapidly expand its school network into Northern Pakistan.<sup>15</sup> Since the American-led operation in Afghanistan, al Qaeda appears to have shifted this focus on the Horn of Africa and Northern Africa.

The Islamic Action Committee's central philosophy creates a diametrically opposed ideology to Western and United Nations values. Bruce Lincoln separates the viewpoints into 'Maximalist' and 'Minimalist' philosophies.<sup>16</sup> In al Qaeda's Maximalist ideology, religion is the central domain of culture, deeply involved in the aesthetic and ethical practices of its community. The West on the other hand is Minimalist, where the economy is the central domain of culture with religion restricted to the private sphere and metaphysical concerns. Al Qaeda's cultural preferences are constituted largely as morality and stabilized by religion, whereas the West's are constituted as more short-term fashions that are open to market fluctuations. For al Qaeda, religious authority

provides coherent and ongoing order for all, against the West's desire for capitalist dynamism, which delivers order through the rapid expansion of individual wealth and power. Finally, for al Qaeda and their potential followers, the West's Minimalist system has been experienced as elitist, powerful, intrusive and a dangerous threat, largely as a result of American foreign policy and imperialism.<sup>17</sup> The West in response tends to view Maximalist systems as a quaint, seductive diversion for some, and a resentful atavism, capable of reactionary counterattacks for others. In what is classic 'self and other' opinionism, one is thus viewed by the other not just as an anti-ideology, but as a toxic one. This helps to explain why the United States adopted an Israeli-based strategy rather than a European one.

Maximalism was central to bin Laden and Sayyid Qutb's philosophy, as they contemplated what Qutb called 'jahiliyyah,' the barbaric state of spiritual ignorance and rebellion against God's sovereignty. Islam had turned toward jahiliyyah, which is why it had to change and stand firm against the resurgent jahiliyyah of the infidel West.<sup>18</sup> The West and the globalized economic world are threatened by the brutal historical fact that putting religion into a dominant position in culture ensures that conflicts assume religious rather than aesthetic or ethical characteristics, ultimately making them generally more abhorrent and destructive. As Bruce Lincoln points out, "When one rejects the Enlightenment's values en masse and dispenses with its model of culture, one risks not just a return of the repressed, but novel Wars of Religion."<sup>19</sup> This goes some way to explaining why suicide bombers or pilots are acceptable toxic tactics of terror for one side and why the thought of al Qaeda's philosophy overcoming a nuclear

power such as Pakistan, or a nuclear Islamic Republic of Iran, induces almost paranoiac fear in the West.

### How Can Al Qaeda be Defeated?

In March 2005, the London-based Arabic newspaper Al-Quds Al-Arabi, published extracts from the Egyptian Colonel and al Qaeda fugitive, Saif al-Adel's paper "Al Qaeda's Strategy to the year 2020."<sup>20</sup> In summary, the strategy comprises of five stages:

- Provoke the United States and the West into invading a Muslim country by staging a massive attack, or string of attacks, on United States soil that result in massive civilian casualties.
- Incite local resistance to occupying forces.
- Expand the conflict to neighboring countries, and engage the United States and its allies in a long war of attrition.
- Convert al Qaeda into an ideology and set of operating principles that can loosely be franchised in other countries without direct command and control, and via those franchises incite attacks against the United States and its allies.
- Collapse the United States economy by the year 2020, due to the strain of multiple engagements in numerous locations, making the worldwide economic system - upon which the United States depends - collapse leading to global political instability. Thereafter, conduct a global jihad, led by al Qaeda, to install a Wahhabi Caliphate across the world following the collapse of the West.

If we accept that Colonels can become strategists, and acknowledging that Saif al-Adel may have been writing this paper after 9/11, the final success of the West's

counter strategy still has to be played out. The first two bullets appear to have been completed. But as al Qaeda expands via its principal affiliates; al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb, Al Shabaab (“Youth”) in Somalia, and Egyptian Islamic Jihad, it would seem that the remaining bullets still need to be embattled. Admittedly, 2020 is overly ambitious, but given al Qaeda’s philosophy, the date is largely irrelevant. Provided it can educate enough followers, a multi-generational timescale for completion is entirely in line with al Qaeda’s ideological end state.

Defeating the remaining bullets requires a two-fold approach. The first directly involves United States avoiding a longer war of attrition than is necessary whilst resisting economic meltdown. The second involves the entire globalized economic community defeating this toxic ideology by producing more moderate alternatives. Al Qaeda cannot be defeated by America alone, but the United States clearly has a significant role to play. But what can the United States do when it has clearly lost the ‘hearts’ of the Muslim world?

According to the 9/11 Commission Report, American engagement in the Muslim world is resented. Polls in 2002 found that even amongst the United States friends in the region such as Egypt (the recipient of more United States aid during the past 20 years than any other Muslim country), only 15 percent looked at the United States favorably and two-thirds of those surveyed in 2003, including Indonesia and Turkey (a NATO ally) even thought the United States may attack them. In Africa, Muslim support in Nigeria has plummeted from 71% to 38% towards the United States.<sup>21</sup> The report admits that the United States, “can promote moderation, but cannot ensure its ascendancy. Only Muslims can do this.”<sup>22</sup> It goes on, “Forty percent of adult Arabs are

illiterate, two-thirds of them women...less than two percent have access to the Internet...the United States has to help defeat an ideology...How can the United States and its friends help moderate Muslims combat the extremist ideas?"<sup>23</sup> The report then attempts to answer this by offering a variety of unilateral education options and information messages that seem to reflect a burning desire for the United States to win over the hearts of Muslims, a difficult ask when the United States' general rhetoric in the region is geared towards supporting its principal ally, Israel. In a battle of ideologies there is only a battle for minds, there is no such thing as 'hearts and minds.'

The United States must cut its losses and concentrate on its economy whilst maintaining a low profile in the region, probably for a generation, if it wishes to defeat this ideology. Whether by design or default, President Obama's Asia-Pacific reprioritization appears to have come just at the right time for the United States. The best way of avoiding a long war is not to enter one and preparing for conflict elsewhere is as good a global excuse for avoiding this one as there could be. The United States needs to enable others in this fight, by supporting - as it always has done - with highly resourced DIME, whilst leaving other nations to lead using their own historical strengths. Perhaps there is a role for Europe and Britain in leading the battle for minds?

To overcome bullet 4 above, a globally-financed effort to establish security, re-educate the youth of North Africa and the Middle East and establish moderate long-term educational establishments in every country at risk for the generations that follow is needed. I contend that a new global institution that can coordinate economic aid, interested non-governmental organizations, as well as United Nations and World Bank education and development funding, and can run re-education and help establish

education is needed. It requires a lead nation to step forward to build and base it in, and one that can enthusiastically develop it into an international center of excellence to advise and help nations accept and support global values, the global economy and global democratization. Historically, such institutions have been established in the past, by the British, albeit never on such a global scale. And whilst history may sometimes be an unreliable guide, it is the only guide we have.

#### Attacking the Mind – A very British Alternative

During World War II, political re-education was the British answer to the wartime Allied search for a policy to prevent a resurgence of Germany for a third time as a hostile military power in Europe.<sup>24</sup> Acknowledged at the time as a novel concept - and as such greeted cynically by some internal and external stakeholders when presented in the early 1940s - the approach arguably bears the hallmarks of British Empirical efforts in the latter 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> Century. Lord Milner's work in South Africa, as High Commissioner after the Boer War, seems to have provided the framework for the many techniques and ideas that were later used in Germany.<sup>25</sup> Contemporary Brits may not realize this, but there appears to be a historic British pedigree in successfully combating anti-ideologies.

American and Soviet Union proposals for post war Germany initially involved the physical destruction of Germany's means of going to war. The 'Morgenthau Plan' proposed reducing Germany to a 'pastoral economy,' by effectively destroying Germany's industrial capacity.<sup>26</sup> The Soviet Union also advocated 'de-industrialization,' and cognizant of its own emerging ideology followed this with political dismemberment and the removal of the social elite akin to the model used against the Kulaks and Polish officer corps. Probably mindful of the results of the vengeful and vitriolic 1919 Treaty of

Versailles, the British hatched another idea. The British approach removed German ideology, not just de-Nazification but also a form of social de-militarization, to eradicate the ideas and principles upon which Germany's authoritarian and military political system were based, replacing them with the ethical, philosophical and political ideas of Britain and her transatlantic descendants.<sup>27</sup> These same ideas also provided the bedrock philosophical and political framework for the United Nations. Using every DIME strategic lever of power available, whilst raising another of equal importance to ensure generational change was maintained (education), Germany was to be re-educated to embrace the rule of law, 'rechtsstaat' not 'real-politik', constitutionalism instead of statism, and philosophical pragmatism instead of Hegelian idealism.<sup>28</sup> By re-educating Germans that soldiers were paid servants of the community and not the national elite, as well as that individuals legitimized the state and not the other way round, militarism could be eliminated. The British approach therefore did not target the body, but instead targeted the mind.

The primary means of operationalizing this approach involved pulling on the traditional strategic lever of information whilst creating a new strategic lever of power through education. By doing so, the British sought to control and manipulate the media of public opinion formation but also the ideologues, the agencies and individuals that formulated attitudes. Naturally, information concentrated on utilizing the press, cinema and radio, but education ultimately remade Germany. By re-building, re-staffing and redesigning the educational curriculum, part of which concentrated on rewriting national history, the education system secured a multi-generational change in outlook. In addition to resourcing the remaining strategic levers, Germans were taught to model

themselves on democratic, liberal Britain and the remainder of the English speaking world.

Given the political values it stood for, British re-education policy gradually gained American acceptance, was incorporated into Japanese post-war planning, and was formalized in the 1945 Potsdam Agreement on German occupation and reconstruction. Although many in the United States State Department favored it over the ‘Morgenthau Plan,’ re-education assumed a different priority amongst the three allies within the collection of long and short term plans known collectively as the Four D’s; De-militarization, De-Nazification, Democratization, and De-Industrialization.<sup>29</sup> While the US initially went about enforcing the Four D’s, and to a lesser extent re-education, with a “characteristically missionary zeal,” the Soviet Union went on to brutally force through communist social and political ideology upon East Germany and all areas they occupied, which also took a generation for NATO to overcome by utilizing economic and military means to outspend the opposing Warsaw Pact’s underpinning ideology.<sup>30</sup> Communism is still being educated out of Russia and the former Soviet satellites, demonstrating once more the multi-generational timescales required in defeating a toxic ideology as well as the, all too often, down-played potential that education possesses as a strategic lever in its own right.

Although re-education had been generally accepted as a concept, American efforts initially concentrated on implementing an Information-biased strategy. Following a proscribed DIME strategy, re-education was used as a term but not truly implemented. Information, through film, was used from 1945 to 1952, in an almost retributional manner. As one German put it, “The idea that the nation should look back, questioning

and repenting, was the concept of the conqueror...the people only worried about how to fill their stomachs and their stoves.” It was a wasted opportunity that the United States has hidden by having the victor’s luxury of writing the post war history. As David Culbert points out, “Nobody, in retrospect, find much to praise in American efforts to re-educate Germany after 1945...As a result, the ever-increasing flood of books about Nazi Germany turns to a tiny trickle for the years between 1945 and 1952.” Lack of volumes speaks volumes. By 1952 the Americans had fully adopted British re-education techniques, but not before one American officer had admitted to Robert Birley, the head of British educational efforts in Germany, that, “You British have been occupying countries all your life. We have only done it once...our own country in the civil war – and look what a mess we made of it.”<sup>31</sup> The point is that while the British have had a long history in tackling ideologies, the United States has traditionally been outstanding at resourcing DIME, but less successful at conceiving bespoke strategies for unique problem sets. This may be due to carrying Jomini in most civil war knapsacks, but it is a historical lesson that appears to have continued with the American-led counter al Qaeda strategy today. It is perhaps why a British lead may provide the answer to defeating today’s toxic ideology.

British priorities differed greatly from those of the Americans and Soviets in post war Germany. Placing re-education at the center of its policy, the British played down the physical measures required by the Four D’s. Even with regard to de-Nazification, after removing prominent Nazis, the British seem to have been content to empower German minds to take on the long-term task rather than relying on the American and Soviet witch-hunt by military government; a lesson the United States had to relearn

during the largely discredited de-Baathification process in Iraq, which is widely regarded by many scholars as having done more harm than good. Being less rigidly tied to an ideology - as is still the case of the United States - the British were also pragmatic when it came to democratization. Unfazed by whether Germany followed the path of popular democracy, indirect constitutional democracy or even a mildly socialist system, the British demonstrated a pragmatic flexibility that continues to this day. All that mattered to the British was that German minds were changed for the long-term and Germany did not start another European war. Unlike the Americans or the Soviets, the British looked to change the administrative basis of the German education system as little as possible. What mattered was what was taught, not how or necessarily by whom. By doing this the British were able to decentralize the educational process, empower the locals to get on with the task of teaching the right things and allowed the Germans to maintain a degree of cultural autonomy, and most importantly re-establish some pride.

The conception, planning and execution of German re-education started as early as 1918. The British dedicated some of their finest minds to the problem of preventing Germany's warlike culture from resurfacing, which included creative minds such as H. G. Wells, then director of British propaganda effort towards Germany, and E. H. Carr. Changing minds was the business of propaganda, but the initial ideas of re-education were hatched by the Political Warfare Executive before finally being implemented via showpiece institutions such as Wilton Park. Born of information, the idea became an exercise that extended into all areas of publication, elite and youth training as well as education, with an almost Orwellian flavor against the "straightforward" DIME measures proposed by others.<sup>32</sup> It was thus an imaginative, bespoke solution to defeating a toxic

ideology, and one that demonstrates that with a similar approach today's challenger could succumb to a similar methodology. There is no doubt that re-education was successful in Germany and Japan. As Nicholas Pronay concludes, given that, "neither shows signs of reverting to former habits or ambitions, there appears little doubt that they are as close today to the Anglo-Saxon ideas of a polity as the British planners of re-education could possibly have hoped."<sup>33</sup>

It is worth considering some of the British methodology that took place to achieve this success. As early as 1943, the British realized that, "re-education of a people comes better from inside the people themselves." It was backed by the notion that, "you cannot force ideas down people's throats."<sup>34</sup> This philosophy was central to early British success, where other allies initially floundered. In Germany, British Education Officers embraced the ideal. Shunning propagandist methods, they regarded themselves as guides, philosophers and friends, selecting German educationists for their ability, whilst begrudgingly relying on the brutal Allied information campaign to serve its purpose of not letting Germans forget.<sup>35</sup> But, coming to terms with the past was a lengthy business. The key to the success of re-education was therefore rebuilding German pride through personal contact over time. British Educationalists became mentors and facilitators for German learning, using a system recognizable to anyone who has been through a military staff college. Speakers were used regularly to guide and offer advice to German opposite numbers, seminar-based learning encouraged, and organized trips to Britain used to reinforce the credibility of what they had been offered.

There were also 2.7 million prisoners of war (POWs) outside of Germany. Again, using recognizable staff college methodologies, the British as early as 1943, started to

re-educate German POWs. Special camps were run for theological students and youth under 26 (extensively young males). The show piece was the residential college at Wilton Park that targeted potential German leadership. From January 1946, Wilton Park ran six week courses for 300 at a time. From 1947 German civil leaders joined the courses. Having been set the political left and right of arc, the curriculum allowed Germans themselves to discuss the burning problems of the past and future, using largely seminar-based learning backed by many distinguished visiting speakers. By the time Wilton Park held its Jubilee Conference in 1971, 12,000 had attended courses. One of them was Helmut Schmidt, who went on to become German Chancellor, who hailed Wilton Park's contribution stating, "Many ideas became a political reality."<sup>36</sup> In 1947, a Dutch civilian said to Robert Birley, "The last war was not the kind of war that could be won by winning it. That had to come after it was over." A generation later when Willy Brandt won the election on September 28, 1969 he remarked, "Tonight, finally and forever, Hitler lost the war."<sup>37</sup>

### Threats and Opportunities

#### This will Never Work

The first problem with any idealistic proposal such as this is convincing realists it can work. When the term "re-education" first appeared in British official documents in 1942, the egregious Member of Parliament for Marylebone, Alec Cunningham-Reid, attacked it during a parliamentary debate.

What a fantastic idea it is to attempt to educate a whole race to be peaceful, a race that for centuries has had an instinct for war deep down in its nature. I believe it would be much easier to educate 80 million baboons.

—Right Honorable Alec Cunningham-Reid MP DFC, May 27, 1943.<sup>38</sup>

There is sadly no quote to confirm whether Cunningham-Reid acknowledged he had been wrong before he died in 1977, but in reply to his attack in 1943, R. A. Butler, President of the British Board of Education, introduced a critical principle, “We would be wise to realize that re-education of a people comes better from inside the people themselves...We may hope to start such a leaven within the country that a real self-education and re-education arises.”<sup>39</sup>

The idea that people be presented with an opportunity rather than a threat once defeated is critically significant, particularly when addressing the perceived criticism that it will never work unless the target audience has been totally defeated. Cora Goldstein introduces this notion in relation to a perceived failure of American strategy in Afghanistan.<sup>40</sup> She asks why the United States has been unable to accomplish its original objectives in Afghanistan when it was able to radically transform two formidable enemies, Germany and Japan, following World War II? Building on David Edelstein’s hypothesis, that military occupations only succeed if they occur in a “threat environment,” she contends that the absence of a strong and believable threat leads to a desire for self-determination and the emergence of resistance.<sup>41</sup> Democratization by force (political ideology change) can only have a chance of success in the aftermath of a war that results in the catastrophic defeat of the enemy, “When the war ended with the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers, the Germans and the Japanese were in a state of psychological paralysis and war weariness that made them compliant.”<sup>42</sup> Such conditions are, however, not solely required for success.

When changing Germany and Japan, the United States brought the lion’s share of resources to bear to support DIME. But in reality, diplomatic, informational, military

and economic effort, apart from providing the critical enablers to defeat the respective ideologies, were also the tools by which threat and retribution were executed. The British system of re-education, far from providing a threat, provided the locals instead with humane opportunity, which they embraced and in the case of the Japanese, fully exploited.

John W. Dower and Masako Shibata back this analogy. As soon as the Japanese surrender had been signed, the Japanese embarked on one of the most impressive ‘consent and evade’ actions in history against their American conquerors. Far from Japanese re-education being a product of American policy, as is generally written this time within the victor’s history, the Japanese carefully resisted American efforts, largely because once more the United States imposed a, “brutal root-and-branch agenda of demilitarization and democratization that was in every sense a remarkable display of arrogant idealism - both self righteous and genuinely visionary.” Despite this resistance, Dower goes on to say, “...the ideals of peace and democracy took root in Japan – not as a borrowed ideology or imposed vision, but as a...*seized opportunity*.<sup>43</sup>

Masako Shibata explains that the Americans responsible for re-education never trusted the Japanese Ministry of Education throughout the entire occupation. Seeing the writing on the wall, the Japanese seized the initiative and removed militaristic educators and replaced them with liberals before the occupation began. 115,000 teachers and educational administrators avoided American screening and dismissal by simply resigning before the Americans arrived. They also reviewed pre 1945 text books before presenting the Americans with a Japanese written, liberal, education strategy in September 1945, it was largely adopted. The Japanese educational establishment then

re-employed the educational staff largely from the staff who had resigned.<sup>44</sup> With embedded liberal teachers already in place, who had had their fill of the militarists who had led them to disaster, the Japanese then seduced their occupiers with, “politeness, entertainment and elegant presents.”<sup>45</sup>

Germans (given the opportunity) and Japanese (taking the opportunity) were therefore the true implementers of re-education, not the Allies. Educational change therefore does not need to take place as a result of a threat, but is more often seized as an opportunity to retain culture and pride, whilst imposing necessary change. It is one more reason why this ‘new’ strategic lever has potential today. Moreover, as it did in 1942 right up to today, education placates liberals on all sides as a - non-violent - potential lever of power. Nonetheless, it will still require strategic patience; it will be as difficult to judge success against al Qaeda as it was against the Axis powers. Richard Birley was asked in 1949 if he thought re-education was working but he refused to answer the question and instead quoted his French colleague, who by this stage had adopted the British methodology, “You must wait for a generation and see.”<sup>46</sup>

If education appeases liberals, the term ‘re-education’ may not appeal. It is admittedly harsh, and implies a dictatorial methodology rather than a progressive liberal transformation. But, it is already being used openly in the media in a positive light. The Saudis have already started a pilot scheme of re-educating al Qaeda youth in their own version of Wilton Park with a degree of early success. One columnist notes, “an enlightened attitude to the rehabilitation of those who have been duped into supporting the bigoted ideas of al Qaeda has led to a small but significant number of captured

terrorists rejecting their evil past and seeking to live new and decent lives in society.”<sup>47</sup>

We too must wait for a generation and see.

### An Opportunity for a New *British* Lead?

Assuming the United States moves away from the direct fight towards an enabling role against al Qaeda and its affiliates while it addresses other global priorities in the Asia-Pacific, an opportunity may arise for a new global leadership role to win the battle of minds. The British may find themselves in a unique position to take on this role. The United Kingdom is likely to continue to find itself, along with France, in the front line of European nations in Libya, Mali, Syria and elsewhere in the Maghreb, while it seeks to secure trade and energy sources for Europe in the years ahead. But, it cannot be everywhere at all times and needs an alternative strategy that also deals with its own war weariness after a generation of conflict in Northern Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan. Britain has no choice but to stand against toxic ideologies that threaten the Western and global values upon which it relies as a globally-focused trading nation.

The British clearly have a history of defeating anti-ideologies that stretches through Empire to Germany and Japan. But the United Kingdom also has a strong culturally diverse and liberal population, founded on the oldest parliamentary democracy in the world with values that founded not only United States ideology, but the values that govern the United Nations. The United Kingdom has well-developed governance as well as some of the finest universities in the world. It has a long tradition of philosophy, liberal education, and a well-educated military. But, pragmatically, as this paper has attempted to illustrate, it has three Prime Ministers, and potentially a future Prime Minister, lined up to tackle this issue head on. Their - already quoted - rhetoric appears to strongly back this assumption.

As Britain prepares to take on a leadership role in the G8, and possesses the United Nations Education Envoy in Gordon Brown, it seems well placed now to offer to take the lead in defeating al Qaeda's ideology by building a British-based, but internationally funded, institution that can build upon the historical lessons of Wilton Park and contemporary successes in Saudi Arabia on re-education, democratization and governance to assist nations in developing Minimalism rather than Maximalism. The world also needs a global institution that can fight the future al Qaeda's by promoting these global values.

Should the international community request that such an institution be established, the British are well placed to advise through their own military professional schools at the Joint Services Command and Staff College with its world renowned War Studies department from King's College London, as well as its strategic studies center of excellence in the Royal College of Defence Studies. Britain's universities and think-tanks (one still bears the name and traditions of Wilton Park) are also well suited to support such an international establishment's emergence. But, it must be staffed and attended internationally for credibility; unilateralism will not work regardless of the sponsor. In the same way that United States' assistance is being shunned by Muslim populations, so too could the United Kingdom's. Nonetheless, for relatively little cost, could such an international institution one day conceivably even assist meritocratic-communist China in resetting itself into a more secure democratic future? The opportunities seem boundless for both developing and developed nations who are in search of ideological assistance.

Although idealistic (and as likely as ever to be subject to realist ridicule), consideration should be given to the creation of such an institution sooner rather than later. If we wait another generation, we may finally lose the battle for minds against al-Qaeda, miss the opportunity to have a global institution to defeat the next toxic ideology to emerge in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, or neglect the possibility to assist developing - and developed - nations in resisting anti-ideologies that may proliferate toxicity. If the world wishes to advance global values and norms we need to teach the 'right' things. It is not a new concept. Idealism may be the only way to defeat ideologies.

*Teaching wrong things is a crime.*

—Kautilya, circa 300 BCE.<sup>48</sup>

#### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>From a speech made to the United Kingdom Parliament over Algeria and Mali, January 21, 2013, "UK in 'generational struggle' against terror, says PM," [www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21130484](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21130484) (accessed February 15, 2013).

<sup>2</sup>DIME: Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic; the commonly accepted strategic levers of power.

<sup>3</sup>Taken from an interview with the former British Prime Minister and Middle East Envoy Right Honorable Tony Blair Member of Parliament, on the BBC current affairs television program, "The Andrew Marr Show," [www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21312687](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21312687) (accessed February 15, 2013).

<sup>4</sup>I have used the term 'anti-ideologies' in this paper to describe ideologies that may still be contrary to the emerging global norms and values, but may not go as far as employing the Maximalist tactics proscribed by toxic ideologies such as al Qaeda. Such ideologies may still need to be challenged early as they often provide the catalyst for the emergence of toxic ideas.

<sup>5</sup>It is worth noting that in the United Kingdom, and offering advice to Europe, the re-education and education of potentially radicalized Muslim Diasporas has been managed for several years through the Institute for Strategic Dialogue. See [www.counterextremism.org/resources/?theme%5B%5D=19&word=](http://www.counterextremism.org/resources/?theme%5B%5D=19&word=) (accessed March 4, 2013).

<sup>6</sup>Right Honorable Ed Miliband Member of Parliament, Leader of the Opposition and candidate for next United Kingdom Prime Minister. Responding to Prime Minister's statement on Mali, January 21, 2013. "UK in 'generational struggle' against terror, says PM." [www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21130484](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21130484) (accessed February 15, 2013).

<sup>7</sup>“Taliban Continue to Target Schools,” February 15, 2013, [www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21479169](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21479169) (accessed February 15, 2013).

<sup>8</sup>*The Qur'an*, trans. by M.A.S. Abdel. (Oxford, 2005), 428.

<sup>9</sup>“United Nations Education Envoy Malala Day Press Statement.” [www.educationenvoy.org/press/malala-day-press-statement](http://www.educationenvoy.org/press/malala-day-press-statement) (accessed February 15, 2013).

<sup>10</sup>Cora Goldstein. “The Afghanistan Experience: Democratization by Force,” *Parameters* No.3 (Autumn 2012): 19.

<sup>11</sup>“Text of President Obama’s Convention Speech,” September 6, 2012. [www.articles.markeywatch.com/2012-09-06/finance/33650686\\_1\\_war-and-peace-hope-convention/5](http://www.articles.markeywatch.com/2012-09-06/finance/33650686_1_war-and-peace-hope-convention/5) (accessed February 15, 2013).

<sup>12</sup>Thomas X. Hammes. *The Sling and the Stone, On War in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. (Minneapolis, 2006), 135.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., 141.

<sup>16</sup>Bruce Lincoln. *Holy Terrors, Thinking about Religion after September 11*. (Chicago, 2003), 59.

<sup>17</sup>I use the term ‘imperialism’ here in the sense of the using DIME to extend United States’ power and influence, rather than the more traditional interpretation of the use of colonization to achieve the same ends.

<sup>18</sup>Lincoln. *Holy Terrors*, 60.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., 61.

<sup>20</sup>Abel Bari Atwan. *The Secret History of Al Qaeda*. (California, 2006), 221.

<sup>21</sup>Various US Government, *Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*. (Washington DC, July 2004), 375.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., 376.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

<sup>24</sup>Nicholas Pronay and Keith Wilson *The Political Re-education of Germany and her Allies after World War II*. (London and Sydney, 1985), 1.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., 10.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., 1.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid.

<sup>28</sup>‘Rechtsstaat’ is a doctrine in European legal thinking, originally borrowed from German jurisprudence, which can be translated as a “state based on justice and integrity”. It is a “constitutional state” in which government power is constrained by law. See Carl Schmitt *The Concept of the Political*, trans. Schwab. (Chicago, 2006), Chapter 7.

<sup>29</sup>Pronay and Wilson, *Political Re-education of Germany*, 2.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., 3.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., 173.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., 25.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., 4.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., 141.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., 145.

<sup>36</sup>See <http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/about-wilton-park/wilton-park-history/> (accessed February 15, 2013).

<sup>37</sup>Pronay and Wilson, *Political Re-education of Germany*, 150.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., 140.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., 141.

<sup>40</sup>Cora Goldstein is an associate professor of political science at California State University. Her book, *Capturing the German Eye: American Visual Propaganda in Occupied Germany*, focuses on the United States’ experience in post war Germany. Her comparison of American Afghanistan policy with post war Germany and Japan appears in “The Afghanistan Experience: Democratization by Force,” *Parameters* No.3 (Autumn 2012): 18-31.

<sup>41</sup>David M. Edelstein, *Occupational Hazards: Success and Failure in Military Occupation*. (New York, 2010), 23 &157.

<sup>42</sup>Goldstein, “The Afghanistan Experience,” 20.

<sup>43</sup>John W. Dower. *Embracing Defeat. Japan in the Wake of World War II.* (New York, 2000), 23.

<sup>44</sup>Masako Shibata. *Japan and Germany under the US Occupation. A Comparative Analysis of the Post War Education Reform.* (Oxford, 2005), 79.

<sup>45</sup>Dower. *Embracing Defeat*, 24.

<sup>46</sup>Pronay and Wilson, *Political Re-education of Germany*, 94.

<sup>47</sup>Gerald Butt. "Saudi Arabia's al Qaeda Challenge," September 8, 2012.  
[www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19517476](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19517476) (accessed February 15, 2013).

<sup>48</sup>V K Subramanian, *Maxims of Chanakya*. (Delhi, 2000), 171.